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NOTES
REVIEWING ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATIONS:
THE CONTROVERSY RE-EXAMINED
The increasingly prominent place of quasi-judicial administrative
tribunals in the federal judicial system has led in the last three decades to
considerable controversy over the exact role to be played by the agency in
the administration of law. One of the principal subjects of comment and
criticism has been the degree of finality to be accorded agency findings
and decisions on review, a factor which directly affects the significance
of the agency as an adjudicator.
Recent criticism of the practice of reviewing courts under Section
10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Ac has resulted in the drafting
of a series of proposed statutory changes in the scope of review, the most
recent of which is Senate Bill No. 1663, introduced in June, 1963, now
being considered by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.2 The bill
proposes amendment of the APA to substitute the "clearly erroneous"
standard of Rule 52 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the
"substantial evidence" standard developed by the courts and codified in
the APA.3 From the scant explanatory material now available, it ap-
pears that the bill draws its inspiration from the proposed statutes of the
American Bar Association4 and the Hoover Commission's Task Force on
Legal Services and Procedure,' both of which include the same change
as to standards of review.'
While most of the commentators on the two standards assume that
they differ, and that the "clearly erroneous" test provides a broader scope
1. 60 Stat. 243 (1946) ; 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1958).
2. 109 Cong. Rec. 9379 (daily ed. June 4, 1963).
3. "It [the reviewing court] shall . . . (B) hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings and conclusions found to be . . . (5) based upon findings or conclu-
sions of fact that are clearly erroneous ... " Subcomrn. on Administrative Practice
and Procedure, Senate Comn. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Amendments to
the Administrative Procedure Act 39 (Comm. Print 1963). (Proposed amendment in
original italics.) The APA now provides in subsection (5), "Unsupported by sub-
stantial evidence. .. ." 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (B) (5) (1958).
4. The Administrative Procedure Act and the American Bar Association Proposed
Code of Federal Administrative Procedure, 24 ICC PRAc. J. 851, 877 (1957).
5. TAsx FoRcE ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE, REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES
AND PROCEDURE: PREPARED FOR THE COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF TH EXEcUTIvE
BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT 374 (1955).
6. See note 81 infra and accompanying text for the Task Force's proposal. See
note 90 infra and accompanying text for the ABA's proposal. See 109 Cong. Rec. 9388
(daily ed. June 4, 1963) (remarks by Senator Dirksen).
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of review,' there are those who differ.' If the majority is correct, the
proposals for substitution of the "clearly erroneous" standard would
seem to require two implicit assumptions: (1) that the underlying na-
tures and functions of the agency and the district court are similar, or at
least that the differences between them are not so significant as to require
different review of the adjudicators' decisions; and (2) that the "clearly
erroneous" test, even though developed only with reference to review of
trial judges' findings and decisions, is better fitted to review of agency
findings than the substantial evidence rule. The purpose of this note is
to compare the two standards, attempt to ascertain the probable effect of
a change on appellate review of agency findings of fact and so-called
questions of mixed fact and law, and test the validity of the assumptions
set forth above. In the discussion, primary attention will be paid to the
proposals of the Task Force and the ABA because they remain the most
prominent and well-documented. It should be noted at the outset that in
the final analysis any such discussion is necessarily theoretical, for until
a standard is judicially adapted to the peculiar requirements of its subject-
matter the standard's meaning cannot be ascertained with any great de-
gree of certainty.'
I. THE APA AND COURT PRACTICE
So far as is relevant for present purposes, the APA prescribes the
existing scope of review in the following manner:
Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2)
agency action is by law committed to agency discretion- . . .
(e) Scope of review.-So far as necessary for decision and
where presented the reviewing court shall decide all relevant
7. E.g., Gatchell, The Impact of the Administrative Process on the Judicial Branzch
of the Government, 16 FFD. BAR J. 482, 488 (1956) ; Sellers, The American Bar Associa-
tiom's Legislative Proposals Respecting Legal Services and Procedures, 24 ICC PRAc. J.
1115, 1121 (1957); Priest, The Independent Regulatory Agencies, 24 ICC PRAc. J.
796, 804 (1957) ; Benjamin, A Lawyer's View of Administrative Procedure-The Ainer-
ican Bar Association Program, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 203, 233 (1961).
8. Cooper, Judicial Review, 30 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 1375, 1380 (1955); Davis, Judicial
Trends in the Review of Administrative Agency Decisions, 11 AD. L. BuLL. 194, 195
(1958).
9. The phrase "clearly erroneous," or some variation of it, has appeared in a few
appellate decisions in review of agency findings. It usually seems to have been the
result of confusion of the standards, or of mere inadvertence, and does not appear to
have affected the decisions. See e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 196 F.2d
459, 465 (7th Cir. 1952) ; NLRB v. Radio Officer's Union, 196 F.2d 960, 962 (2d Cir.
1952); Consolidated Royal Chen. Corp. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 396, 400 (7th Cir. 1951);
Denver Chicago Transp. Co. v. United States, 183 F. Supp. 785, 786-87 (D. Colo.
1960). But see Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 815 (9th Cir. 1962),
where the court made a deliberate substitution of the "clearly erroneous" standard.
NOTES
questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provi-
sions, and determine the meaning or applicability of any agency
action. It shall . . . (B) hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . (5) un-
supported by substantial evidence. . . . In making the forego-
ing determinations the court shall review the whole record or
such portions thereof as may be cited by any party. ... °
The substantial evidence test incorporated in section 10(e) is, at
least in form, the same test as is applied in jury trials on motions for
directed verdict or judgment n.o.v.," i.e., the evidence must be sufficient
to justify a refusal to direct a verdict." But the rule is more frequently
stated and applied without reference to the jury standard. A leading and
basic interpretation, contained in Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,"8 de-
fines substantial evidence as "more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to sup-
port a conclusion."' 4  Mr. Justice Frankfurter's oft-cited opinion in
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB"0 adds some refinement. Frankfurter
primarily concerned himself with the APA's prescription of review on the
whole record. The court, he stated, is not to examine the record to de-
termine whether there is any evidence which, if taken alone, would sup-
port the agency's conclusion; it must "take into account whatever in the
record fairly detracts from its weight."' 6  But he further observed that
while Congress did not intend to change fundamentally the scope of re-
view as stated in such cases as Consolidated Edison, it had "expressed a
10. 60 Stat. 243 (1946) ; 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1958). Other subsections are omitted
because, with one exception, they bear no direct relation to the ABA proposal consider.
ed here. The exception is 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (B) (I) (1958),
which prescribes the setting aside of agency action which is "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." The ABA contemplates
no substantial change beyond the addition of the phrase, "clearly unwarranted exercise
of discretion." The phrase has no determinate meaning, and the ABA states no purpose
for its insertion beyond a vague strengthening of judicial control over discretion. 81
ABA Rep. 508 (1956).
11. Stern, Review of Findings by Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Compara-
tive Analysis, 58 HAtv. L. REv. 70, 74 (1944).
12. NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939);
Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 1953). It has been
said less frequently that the test is the same as that applicable to review of jury ver--
dicts on appeal. NLRB v. Bell Oil & Gas Co., 98 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 1938).
13. 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
14. Id. at 229. NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292,
299-300 (1938); Coppus Eng'r Corp. v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 564, 570 (1st Cir. 1957);
E. Edelmann & Co. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1957); NLRB v. Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co., 188 F.2d 780, 788 (9th Cir. 1941). And see SwENsoN, FEDERAL ADmiw-
isTRATiWv LA-w 258-64 (1952) ; Stern, supra note 11, at 77-79.
15. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
16. Id. at 488.
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mood" that the courts, or at least some of them, were to expand and
strengthen the scope of review in the indefinable area of judgment within
the existing standard."7
Application of the Substantial Evidence Rule to Inferences of Fact
The most frequent and important use of the substantial evidence
standard is in review of "factual inferences," i.e., the inference of the ex-
istence of some state of affairs not directly provable, such as a particular
motive, the quality of a utility's service or the potential of a market. It is
clear that the substantial evidence standard is satisfied if in the opinion of
the court the inference drawn from the evidence or from basic facts is a
rational one,"8 whether or not the reviewing court would have drawn the
same inference. 9 Just what "quantum of rationality" is required by the
court will of course depend upon the individual case, the particular state
of facts and the temper of the judge.2" Nevertheless, the term itself is of
considerable significance for on its face it recognizes that a single body
of data may admit of more than one reasonable inference, each supported
by substantial evidence, and that in such circumstances the court's view
of which inference is "right" should not, in itself, justify a substitution
of its own judgment.
As thus conceived, the rationality standard accords with Professor
Jaffe's explanation of the proper mode of reviewing inferences.2" He
states that once the court determines that the agency's inference is ra-
tionally drawn, it has completed its function. The court is to "weigh"
the evidence only in an elementary sense to determine the rationality of
the agency's inference, but it is not to displace that inference because by
its own independent judgment the weight of evidence points to the con-
clusion that a competing inference is "more probable or even much more
17. "[T]he Administrative Procedure Act . . . direct[s] that courts must now
assume more responsibility for the reasonableness and fairness of Labor Board deci
sions than some courts have shown in the past." Id. at 490.
18. The authorities are in substantial agreement on this point. See Stason, "Sub-
stantial Evidence" in Administrative Law, 89 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1026, 1038 (1941) ; Jaffe,
Judicial Review: Question of Fact, 69 HAxv. L. REv. 1020, 1038 (1956); 4 DAvis,
ADmINISTRATIv LAW TREATISE § 29.05, at 138 (1958) [hereafter cited as 4 DAvis].
19. "While we might, upon consideration of the record de iwvo, reach a contrary
result, we are not prepared to say that the evidence relied upon by the Board, together
with the reasonable inferences available therefrom, was not substantial and adequate.
• . .Therefore, the finding of the Board is 'conclusive' and should not be set aside."
Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 1953). See also
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) ; NLRB v. Nevada Consol.
Copper Corp., 316 U.S. 105, 107 (1942).
20. The Fifth Circuit, for example, appears to be quicker to substitute judgment
and reverse than other circuits. See Cooper, Administrative Law: "The Substantial
Evidence Rule", 44 A.B.A.J. 945, 1001 n. 17 (1958) ; 4 DAvis § 29.06, at 142-43.
21. Jaffe, supra note 18, at 1028-29.
NOTES
probable, ' 22 i.e., more rational or much more rational. The concept of ra-
tionality is thus divorced from the concept of rightness.23
In practice the situation is complicated by cases in which courts ap-
pear to substitute their own judgment (inference) for that of the agency
by means of a "rightness" test. The contrast in methods is apparent in
Rubin Bros. Footwear, Inc. v. NLRB.24  There the court majority set
forth the rationality formula at the beginning of its opinion, but then
proceeded by means of an elaborate review to substitute without equivo-
cation its own inferences for those of the Board." In contrast the dis-
senting judge, however, after considering the substantial evidence rule at
length, concluded that the limited scope of review it prescribes and the
evidence before the court did not justify the court's reversal. Even
further, in his opinion the Board's decision on the evidence was more
rational. 21 Of course the substitution-of-inference method will not affect
the result in cases where the court draws the same conclusions as the
agency, for rightness is embraced within rationality. But its use will lead
to different results where the court is of the opinion that the agency's
inference, though rational, is not right. Courts which substitute judg-
ment for an agency's factual inference go beyond the generally accepted
view of the reviewing court's office, which is not to insure what it might
22. Ibid. "No reviewing court can set aside that inference merely because the
opposite one is thought to be more reasonable." Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Co., 330 U.S.
469, 477-78 (1947). And compare the following statements: "[I]n reviewing the Board's
ultimate conclusions, it is not the Court's function to substitute its own inferences of
fact for the Board's, when the latter has support in the record." NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944). "[T]he function of the District Court
was to review the record to determine whether it contained substantial evidence to
support the administrative decision. Neither we nor the District Court have the right
to make our own appraisal of the evidence." Carqueville v. Flemming, 263 F.2d 875,
878 (7th Cir. 1959).
23. The Supreme Court has gone so far as to say that when it finds support in
the record for the agency's inference, it is "beyond its province to express concurrence
therewith as an original proposition." Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S
125, 146 (1939).
24. 203 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1953).
25. Id. at 487-88. The courts rarely, if ever, employ the rightness test without
also including statements of the substantial evidence rule. This circumstance frequently
makes it difficult to determine whether the court is actually substituting its own
judgment on the basis of which of two fairly conflicting inferences is the right one, or
merely using careless language to illustrate its judgment that the agency's inference
does not meet the required standard of reasonableness when viewed in the light of the
whole record. Compare NLRB v. Coats & Clark Inc., 231 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1956),
and NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 211 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1954), where
use of the rightness test is reasonably clear, with American Brake Shoe Co. v. NLRB,
244 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1957), Deepfreeze Appliance Div., Motor Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 211 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1954), and NLRB v. Stafford, 206 F.2d 19 (8th Cir.
1953), where either test may well have been used. And see 4 DAvis § 29.06, at 143.
26. Id. at 489.
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deem correctness,2 7 but merely to insure that the agency's inferences were
rationally reached by reference to the evidence, and not through an arbi-
trary will.2" The rule of rationality is firmly based on a recognition of
agency discretion and expertise, in addition to its position as primary
examiner of the evidence. To allow substitution of judgment according
to a court's sense of rightness opens the way to destruction of these fac-
tors as working elements in the administrative process.
"'Mixed" Questions of Fact and Law
Use of the substantial evidence test does not end with review of
findings of factual inferences, but is extended on occasion to the review
of so-called mixed questions of fact and law. In prescribing the substan-
tial evidence rule for questions of fact and substitution of judgment for
questions of law, section 10 (e) of the APA incorporates the well-known
fact-law distinction and all the difficulty inherent in it.2" Questions of
fact and questions of law are at times easily distinguishable, e.g., whether
a given event happened compared to whether a later statute has impliedly
superseded an earlier one. The real difficulty arises in attempting to
classify questions involving the application of law to facts, e.g., whether
the evidence shows that a statutory condition is fulfilled. The authori-
ties are in complete disagreement as to the nature of such questions.
Holmes considered them questions of law,"0 Thayer considered them
fact,2 and Austin refused to express an opinion, stating only that the is-
sue in each case is whether given law is applicable to given factsY.2  Dick-
inson's classic statement that the legal and factual elements of such a
decision are inseparable has received considerable support from recent
commentators. 2 In all cases, the mixed question involves both a judg-
27. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ComiITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL RE-
PORT 79 (1941). (Hereinafter cited as ATr'y GEN. Comm!. REP.)
28. Jaffe, supra note 18, at 1025; Kramer, The Place and Function of Judicial
Review in the Administrative Process, 28 FoIaRAm: L. REv. 1, 78 (1959).
29. 60 Stat 243 (1946) ; 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1958).
30. HOL ES, CoLLEcrED LEGAL PAPERS 236 (1920).
31. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENcE 249-50 (1898).
32. 1 AuSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 236 (1873).
33. In truth, the distinction between "questions of law" and "questions of
fact" really gives little help in determining how far the courts will review;
and for the good reason that there is no fixed distinction. They are not two
mutually exclusive kinds of questions, based upon a difference in subject-matter.
Matters of law grow downward into roots of fact, and matters of fact reach
upward, without a break, into matters of law. The knife of policy alone effects
an artificial cleavage. It would seem that when courts are unwilling to review,
they are tempted to explain 'by the easy device of calling the question one of
"fact"; and when otherwise disposed, they say it is a question of "law."
DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAw IN THE UNITED
STATES 55 (1927). E.g., 4 DAVIS § 30.02-03; ATT'Y GEN. Comm. REP. 90. And see the
NOTES
ment of the evidence and an interpretation of the law.
If one were to take the position that the nature of a mixed question
depended upon its prospective application to other cases, he might dis-
tinguish between such decisions on a basis of the relative proportions of
law and fact implicit in each. Where the decision falls within the bounds
of the law as previously interpreted, it will have the effect as precedent
only of supporting the existing interpretation. In such circumstances
it might properly be reviewed as a question of fact. On the other hand,
where an analytically identical decision contains an implicit interpretation
which departs from the existing interpretation or breaks new ground, it
may have a decided effect on future cases, and review of the decision as
one of law may be warranted. It must also be recognized that the relative
proportions of law and fact in a mixed decision admit of infinite varia-
tion. If this proposition is of little more than theoretical value, it at least
serves to illustrate the opportunity provided by the fact-law distinction
for courts to manipulate it in a purely pragmatic manner by expanding
or contracting the scope of review as the case seems to require.
That courts do in fact engage in such manipulation is clear. In
review of administrative decisions they are disposed on the whole to label
a mixed question one of fact and limit their review accordingly. Thus,
in one case where the issue was whether the death of an employee in the
course of a rescue attempt arose "out of and in the course of employment"
within the meaning of section 2 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Worker's Act, the Supreme Court held that the question was one of fact
and affirmed the agency decision on a finding of substantial evidence. 5
In a moment of candor almost unknown when this "fact-labelling"
method of review is used, the Court admitted that the question was actu-
ally one of mixed fact-law by stating that it "presuppose[d] applicable
[legal?] standards for assessing the simple external facts."36
Use of this method appears prominently in appeals from decisions
by the adjudicating arm of the Social Security Administration under the
Social Security Act." The act prescribes substantially the same mode of
review for questions of fact as the APA, but it is silent as to review of
Supreme Court's recognition of the difficulty and its expression of dissatisfaction witb
it in Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944).
34. 44 Stat 1424 (1927); 33 U.S.C. § 902(2) (1958).
35. O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 508-09 (1951). See also,
Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick & Co., 353 U.S. 151 (1957); Radio Officers' Union v.
NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); Koppers Co. v. United States, 166 F. Supp. 96 (W.D
Pa. 1958).
36. 340 U.S. at 508-09.
37. See notes 39 & 41 infra.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
questions of law.38 In United States v. Lalone"9 the court said that the
same degree of finality accorded an agency's findings of fact extends as
well to its inferences and conclusions. The court indicated that the
agency's interpretations of the act, while not similarly conclusive, are en-
titled to great weight, thus leaving the final decision to the court. But in
applying these standards to the question of whether appellant's deceased
was an "employee" within the meaning of the statute, the court refused
to substitute judgment on the legal aspect of the decision and based its
affirmance largely on a finding of substantial evidence."0 In numerous,
analytically identical cases, courts have ignored the legal aspect of such
decisions by the Administration and have applied only the substantial evi-
dence standard.41 The effect of the method is, of course, to review im-
plicit statutory interpretations by the rule of rationality applied to purely
factual inferences.
This method of reviewing mixed questions can be criticized for the
opportunity it affords courts to overlook the presence of implicit statu-
tory interpretation in agency decisions. But the method is justified to
some extent by the relative novelty of the questions to which it is applied.
Most of the legislation agencies are charged with implementing has no
counterpart in the common law, and therefore neither agency nor review-
ing court has the advantage of a body of legal standards similar to those
which exist in common law areas to aid in applying statutes to diverse
factual situations. What constitutes unfair competition, the danger of
lessened competition or of monopoly, or an interurban electric railway
within the meaning of statutory terms, is of necessity largely a question
to be determined by an informed judgment of economic conditions which
38. "The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive. . . ." 53 Stat. 1370 (1939) ; 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1958).
39. 152 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1945).
40. Id. at 44-45.
41. E.g., Carqueville v. Flemming, 263 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1959); Thompson v.
Social Security Bd., 154 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1946); McGrew v. Hobby, 129 F. Supp.
627 (D. Kan. 1955).
Use of this technique may lead to difficulties. In Miller v. Burger, 161 F.2d 922
(9th Cir. 1947), the court was faced with the problem of reconciling the district court's
substitution of judgment on the legal aspect of a mixed question with the case law
holding that such questions were matters of fact to be determined by the agency. It
distinguished the case before it by reasoning that, since the facts were undisputed, the
question became one of law for judicial decision. But the nature of the question does
not change because the facts are undisputed. The better course would have been to
recognize that, case law to the contrary, the question had a legal aspect, and that in
this case, its resolution was dependent, not upon the facts, but upon interpretation of
legislative history, a matter of law for the court. The court's questionable reasoning
may have resulted from a failure to recognize the partially artificial nature of the
fact-labelling method-that by its nature it ignores the legal aspect of the mixed
decision.
NOTES
frequently are new. The statutory terms usually furnish little help to
the decider.
The fact-labelling method just described is neither the only tool, nor
indeed the most frequently used tool, for restricting review of mixed
questions.4 -  Courts more often employ the "rational basis" rule of
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.," which is that the agency decision
should not be disturbed if it has "warrant in the record and a reasonable
basis in law." '44 Although the two methods are historically related in that
the fact label technique appeared in some of the foundation cases of the
rational basis rule,45 they are clearly distinguishable. The rational basis
test recognizes both sides of a mixed question, while the fact-labelling
method ignores the legal aspect. The former rule avoids all reference to
the fact-law distinction; the latter requires its use.4" But the effect of
the "rational basis" test is to import the same rule of rationality into re-
view of mixed questions as is applied in the fact-labelling method. The
factor of "warrant in the record" is indistinguishable from the standard
of substantial evidence, and the courts occasionally substitute the latter
phrase for the former.4" "Reasonable basis in law" carries its own de-
scription; the court will not substitute its judgment if the agency's in-
terpretation is a reasonably permissible or rational one.48 Although the
better reasoning would support the dictum in Dobson v. Commissioner"
that the rational basis test should be applied only where a court cannot
separate the elements of fact and law," courts do not recognize this re-
finement and apply the standard even where the evidence is compelling
and the question is primarily a matter of statutory interpretation.'
42. 4 DAVIs § 30.05, at 219.
43. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
44. Id. at 131.
45. Id. at 130. Shields v. Utah Idaho Ry., 305 U.S. 177, 180 (1938). From a
theoretical standpoint, the Court's use of the fact label is inexplicable. See text im-
mediately infra. The only reasonable explanation for it is that the Court was impelled
by a desire to indicate that the decision under review was something less than a matter
of pure statutory interpretation and that the statutory term involved could only acquire
definite meaning in relation to the factual situation to which it is applied.
46. 4 DAvis § 30.05, at 213-14.
47. E.g., Ferenz v. Folsom, 237 F.2d 46, 49-50 (3d Cir. 1956).
48. "We conclude that the Board's criterion for determining who are officers is
a reasonable, if indeed not a compelling, construction of the statute." NLRB v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 350 U.S. 264, 269 (1956). "But the judicial function is exhausted
when there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions approved by the admin-
istrative body [here, as to propriety of use of the "tax benefit theory" in redetermina-
tion of tax liability]." Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 501 (1943).
49. 320 U.S. 489 (1943).
50. Id. at 502.
51. Federal Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; Director,
United States Bureau of fines v. Princess Elkhorn Coal Co., 226 F.2d 570 (6th Cir.
1955); NLRB v. Pinkerton's Nat. Detective Agency, 202 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1953).
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This latter practice is understandable in view of the policy founda-
tion of the rule. Like the method of labelling the mixed question one of
fact, the rational basis test is founded primarily upon the doctrine of leg-
islative delegation of discretion. Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. Ry."2 furn-
ishes a good statement of the rationale:
As respondent . . . is engaged in interstate transportation, the
question whether it should be subjected to the requirements of
the Railway Labor Act . . . was one for the decision of Con-
gress. . . . As Congress was free to establish the categories
which should be excepted, it could bring to its aid an adminis-
trative agency to determine the question of fact whether a par-
ticular railroad fell within the exception .... 5 3
The court concluded that the agency's determination was supported by
evidence and did not depart from the law, declining to make its own in-
terpretation of the statute.54 Other leading decisions which have utilized
the rational basis test similarly base it on delegation of power to decide, "
and it should be said that the refusal of courts to substitute judgment for
this reason has some justification in the APA provision on review.
While subsection (3) would seem to require substitution of judgment by
the reviewing court on questions of law, it is modified by the introduc-
tory clause of section 10 which precludes review to the extent that agency
action is committed by Congress to the agency's discretion." Where
such is the case, a court is not authorized to substitute judgment and may
only interfere with an abuse of discretion, here an unreasonable interpre-
tation of the law. To the extent that the fact-labelling method of re-
stricting review is also founded upon delegation of discretion to the
deciding agencies, it is similarly supported by the APA provision.
Cases which have applied the reasoning of Shields to agencies other
52. 305 U.S. 177 (1938).
53. Id. at 180. While the quotation, if taken alone, would seem to indicate that
the Court was applying the fact-labelling method, later statements in the case belie this
impression. See the quotation in note 54 infra which indicates that the Court recognized
the legal aspect of the question in its decision. And see the discussion at note 45 supra
and accompanying text. Shields has not received much attention from commentators on
the foundation cases of the rational basis test, but, in the writer's opinion, it contains
one of the best statements of the rationale underlying the test.
54. "The sole remaining question would be whether the Commission in arriving at
its determination departed from the applicable rules of law and whether its finding had
a basis in substantial evidence or was arbitrary and capricious." Id. at 185. "It cannot
be said upon this evidence, and the related facts summarized in the Commission's report,
that the Commission's determination lacked support or was arbitrary or capricious.
Nor is there ground for holding that the Commission in reaching its determination
departed from the applicable principles of law." Id. at 187.
55. See note 57 infra.
56. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958).
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than the particular one involved there'7 support the position that the sole
rationale of the rational basis test rests upon the factor of delegation."
Courts apparently assume that the mere fact that Congress has vested
the initial determination of the mixed question in the agency instead of
the courts indicates an intent to also grant some degree of discretion.
But this does not state the whole matter, for courts frequently go beyond
the delegation rationale to recognize its foundation, viz., that discretion is
usually bestowed upon an agency because of its presumed competence to
relate practical circumstances to statutory purposes. 9 In this practice
courts may ignore delegation, and base a refusal to substitute judgment
on what apparently is their own assessment of the expertise of the
agency." While this approach might be sound from a practical stand-
point, and although it unquestionably is an important factor in the deci-
sion to restrict review or substitute judgment, it has no basis in law
similar to that of the discretion rationale. Where the refusal to substitute
judgment is based on a finding of agency discretion, the court has at least
a theoretical justification in congressional delegation of legislative power.
In contrast, where the court applies only a standard of expertise, inde-
pendently determining the qualifications of the agency and consequently
the scope of its discretionary decision-making power in matters of law,
the court runs the risk of invading the area of discretion delegated by
Congress."'
If use of the fact-labelling and rational basis methods were all there
was to judicial review of mixed questions, the situation would be much
less complicated than it actually is. In fact, courts have ignored these
methods and have substituted judgment, even in cases which are analyti-
cally identical to those in which they have restricted their review. In the
substitution of judgment cases, they typically state that although the ex-
pert agency's interpretation of the statute is entitled to great weight, final
57. "It is not necessary in this case to make a completely definitive limitation
around the word 'employee.' That task has been assigned primarily to the agency creat-
ed by Congress to administer the Act." NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S.
111, 130 (1944). And see SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 207 (1947); Gray v.
Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 412 (1941) (National Bituminous Coal Comm.) ; Rochester Tel.
Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939) (FCC) ; Trans-Pacific Freight Conference
of Japan v. Federal Maritime Comm., 314 F.2d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 1963); Federal
Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 46, 49-50 (3rd Cir. 1956).
58. Stern, supra note 11, at 99-109.
59. Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 413 (1958); NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944) ; Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411 (1941).
60. NLRB v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 350 U.S. 264, 299 (1956) ; Director, United
States Bureau of Mines v. Princess Elkhorn Coal Co., 226 F.2d 570, 574 (6th Cir.
1955). And see note 75 infra.
61. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 152-55 (1938), presents an eloquent
argument that the standard of expertise should control.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
judgment on the law remains with the court.62
The decision of whether to substitute judgment or use one of the
restrictive modes of review is primarily a matter of judicial discretion,
as appears from a few examples. In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc. 3
where the question was whether the statutory term "employee" included
news-boys, the court used the rational basis test.64 Three years later the
analytically identical question of whether "employee" included a foreman
arose in Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB,65 and the Court, without men-
tioning the test, substituted judgment.66 In the Social Security cases, it
has been noted above that the courts often use the fact-labelling method
and the substantial evidence rule to restrict review of mixed questions,
but in such cases as Folsom v. Pearsall," Rafal v. Flemming" and Boyd v.
Folsom,9 courts substituted judgment for the Administration's decision
on mixed questions. Finally, the curious opinion in Unemployment Com-
pensation, Comm'n v. Aragond' should be noted. There the question was
62. "Agency determinations of questions of law are entitled to great weight, al-
though not conclusive. . . . 'It is not to be doubted that in the final analysis, statutory
construction is a legal function, and if the Board (under the facts of this case) can
construe the language of the Act, the Courts can examine that construction and deter-
mine its validity or invalidity.' Miller v. Burger, 9 Cir., 1947, 161 F.2d 992, 994. .. ."
Folsom v. Pearsall, 245 F.2d 562, 564-65 (9th Cir. 1957). And see E. Anthony & Sons
v. NLRB, 163 F.2d 22, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1947) ; Carroll v. Social Security Bd., 128 F.2d
876, 881 (7th Cir. 1943) ; Nickerson v. Ribicoff, 206 F. Supp. 232, 234 (D. Mass. 1962).
63. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
64. Id. at 130-31.
65. 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
66. Id. at 488-90. It is worthy of note that the courts seem to prefer an absolute
substitution of judgment where they reverse the agency on interpretation of law, rather
than a finding that the agency decision is improper in the terms of one of the restrictive
methods of review. One explanation of the practice is that, while the courts are striving
to adjust the agency-court relationship by means of development of restrictive tests,
their experiment is far from finished, and that they find need of reverting to their
traditional role when faced with the necessity of rationalizing a substitution of judg-
ment on the law. This would seem to indicate that perhaps the tests in their present
state are too restrictive, and that further refinement is needed.
67. 245 F.2d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 1957).
68. 171 F. Supp. 490, 494 (E.D. Va. 1959).
69. 257 F.2d 778, 781 (3rd Cir. 1958). The differing opinions of the majority and
the dissent as to the proper scope of review make this case particularly interesting.
In contrast to the majority, which stated that it could substitute judgment on the
"legal inferences" drawn from the facts, id. at 781, the dissenter found that the agency's
findings were supported by substantial evidence and that the district court erred in
substituting its findings and inferences. He added, "I concur with this Circuit's recent
pronouncement in Ferenz v. Folsom, wherein the permissible bounds of review were
clearly enunciated. . . ." Id. at 787. (In Ferenz v. Folsom, 237 F.2d 46, 49-50 (3rd
Cir. 1956), the court refused to substitute judgment on a similar mixed fact-law in-
ference, stating both of the restrictive rules of review.)
Similar differences of opinion between majority and dissent appear in Alleghany
Corp. v. Breswick & Co., 353 U.S. 151 (1957), and SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194 (1947).
70. 329 U.S. 143 (1946).
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whether employment had ended "due to a labor dispute which [was] ...
in active progress" for if so, the act withheld unemployment benefits."
On the question of whether there was a "labor dispute" within the mean-
ing of the act, the Court substituted judgment;"' however, as to whether
that labor dispute was "in active progress" within the statutory language,
the rational basis test was applied !"
Thus it is clear that from a theoretical standpoint, judicial treatment
of agency decisions on mixed questions provides little ground for pre-
diction. All that can be concluded is that several factors discernible in
the cases may influence a court in determining what scope of review to
apply to such questions. It may or may not be prompted to substitute
judgment according to its view of the extent of congressional delegation
of discretion. 4 The court's assessment of the comparative qualifications
of the agency and itself to decide the question may also be important."
It may be influenced by whether the agency's implicit interpretation of
law is a broad one, having wide prospective application, or a narrow one
applying only to the instant case.7" Finally, and inevitably, the equities
of the case may have an effect; an agency decision has the best chance
of avoiding substitution of judgment and reversal if it is fair to the
parties, rather than grossly unfair.7 In short, while courts have de-
71. Extraordinary Session Laws of Alaska 1937, Ch. 4, § 5(d), as amended by
Session Laws of Alaska 1939, Ch. 1 and 51.
72. 329 U.S. at 149-50.
73. Id. at 153-54.
74. See, e.g., Office Employees Int'l Union v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957). The
Court, reversing the Board on its refusal to assert jurisdiction because the employer
was a labor union, recognized that the Board could decline to exercise jurisdiction at
its discretion, but stated that its discretionary power did not extend to "a blanket
exclusion of union employers as a class." Id. at 318. The minority was of the opinion
that the Board did have such discretion. Id. at 320.
75. Compare Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943), with Texas Gas
Transmission Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 363 U.S. 263 (1960). In Dobson, the question was
whether the Tax Court's use of the "tax benefi' theory was proper. The Court, after
noting the Tax Court's expertise, experience and delegated discretion, stated that "what-
ever latitude exists in resolving questions such as those of proper accounting . . .
exists in the Tax Court and not in the regular courts; when the court cannot separate
the elements of a decision so as to identify a clear-cut mistake of law, the decision of
the Tax Court must stand." 320 U.S. at 502-03. In the Texas Gas case, the question
was interpretation of a "favored nation" clause in a contract between the parties. In
upholding the circuit court's substitution of judgment, the Court said that "since the
Commission [FPC] professed to dispose of the case solely upon its view of the result
called for by the application of canons of contract construction employed by the courts,
and did not in any wise rely on matters within its special competence, the Court of
Appeals was justified in making its own independent determination ... " 363 U.S.
at 270.
76. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143 (1946), can be
explained on this basis. See 4 DAvis § 30.07, at 222-29. See also NLRB v. American
Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
77. Judge Soper, concurring in NLRB v. Southland Mfg. Co., 201 F.2d 244 (4th
Cir. 1952), is probably correct when he states: "[W]e may not say broadly that it is
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veloped methods for restricting their review of mixed questions, they
still retain a discretionary power to substitute judgment upon more or
less delineable bases.
II. THE ABA's PROPOSED STATUTE AND COURT PRACTICE IN REVIEW
OF DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS
The impetus for the formulation of the ABA's proposed Code of
Federal Administrative Procedure was furnished by the reports, recom-
mendations and proposed statute of the Hoover Commission's Task Force
on Legal Services and Procedure."8 The Task Force stated the policy
considerations underlying all its recommendations in the assumptions
that sound administrative procedures are essential to justice, and that the
more closely administrative procedures can be brought into conformity
with established judicial procedures, the greater the probability that jus-
tice will be attained.79  More specifically, it said that judicial control
of administrative action should be strengthened for the protection of
individual rights."0
The influence of these policy considerations is apparent in the section
on judicial review proposed by the Task Force:
Section 207(f) Scope of Review-The reviewing court shall
determine whether agency findings, inferences, conclusions, or
actions... (6) (i),... are clearly erroneous in view of the reli-
able, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record....
(g) Decisions On Review- . . . The reviewing court shall de-
termine all relevant questions of law and interpret any constitu-
tional or statutory provisions involved, and it shall apply such
determination to the facts duly found or established, whether or
not such court is the trier of the facts.8"
beyond our power to inquire whether the findings are so clearly erroneous that injustice
has been done. . . ." Id. at 250.
78. See TASK FORCE ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE, REPORT ON LEGAL
SERVICES AND PROCEDURE: PREPARED FOR THE COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT (1955) (hereafter cited as REPORT TO THE
COMMIISSION), and COMIssIoN ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE
GOVERNMENT, LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE: A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS (1955)
(hereafter cited as REPORT TO THE CONGRESS).
79. REPORT TO THE COIMISSION 138.
80. Id. at 28. It is interesting to note that Mr. Chet Holifield, a dissenting mem-
ber of the Commission, anticipated the coming controversy over the Task Force's pro-
posals. He criticized the Task Force report as too legalistic in its approach. REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS 97-98. And he objected to its proposals "to the extent that the proposed
changes . . . seek a basic shift of administrative power to the courts or offer loop-
holes for thwarting agency action in carrying out congressional policies." Id. at 111.
81. REPORT TO THE COMMISSION 374.
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As to the change from the substantial evidence rule to the dearly er-
roneous standard, the Task Force said that the more restrictive scope of
review under the former rule was justified only because fragmented, dis-
organized records resulting from informal adjudicative procedures made
it difficult for the appellate court to evaluate the facts in the same man-
ner as in reviewing district court records. Once agency procedure was
judicialized in accordance with other provisions of the proposed statute, 2
the reason for different treatment of agency and district court decisions
on review would disappear.8 3 The Task Force did not propose to destroy
the substantial evidence rule, but only "to modify and add definitions to
it by relating it to the scope of review of findings of fact by appellate
courts under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."84
As to review of questions of law and mixed fact-law, the Task
Force expressed its disapproval of the rational basis test, stating that
courts should always decide questions of law and should expand their
review of mixed questions.8 " The Task Force noted that subsection (g)
would serve both these ends."4 Finally, in one cryptic comment, it stated
that the current limited scope of review of mixed questions arises from
the use of the substantial evidence rule and that prescription of the clearly
erroneous standard would make review of such questions adequate.
Whether the Task Force meant to allude specifically to the fact-labelling
method of dealing with the fact-law distinction, as distinguished from
the rational basis test, is not clear. On the one hand, its subsection (g)
would seem to require substitution of judgment on all mixed questions,
including those which primarily depend upon a judgment of the facts.
The effect of this literal reading is to emasculate the fact-law distinc-
tion, for in traditional terms all analytically mixed questions become
questions of "law" for a court. On the other hand, such an interpreta-
tion renders the Task Force's statement irrelevant; the fact that the
clearly erroneous standard presumably provides a broader scope of re-
view in mixed questions than substantial evidence has no significance if
all mixed questions are to be decided by the court as a matter of law any-
way. The more reasonable inference is that the Task Force did not in-
82. The Task Force was presumably referring to §§ 202, 204-06 of the Task
Force's proposed code which concern adjudication, hearings, decisions and miscellaneous
procedural matters. Id. at 366-72.
83. Id. at 215; REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 75.
84. REPORT TO THE CONGRESs 75. "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, 'and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge of the credibility of the witnesses." FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
85. REPORT TO THE CoiuissioN 216-18.
86. Id. at 218.
87. Id. at 216-17.
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tend to abolish the fact-law distinction entirely. This conclusion is sup-
ported by (1) the statement of the Task Force that it intended to sub-
ject the agencies to the scope of review that is applied to the district
courts,88 (2) the fact that, as will appear, appellate courts utilize and
manipulate the fact-law distinction in review of district court action and
(3) the fact that a literal interpretation of subsection (g) would there-
fore distort the scope of review into something not intended by the Task
Force. Finally, it appears that the Task Force's subsection admits of a
liberal interpretation. A court might recognize its affirmative duty to
interpret all statutory provisions, but still find that Congress intended the
application of a provision to be determined according to factual require-
ments, within its general statement of policy. A court might thus con-
clude that no occasion for specific statutory interpretation was presented
and that the mixed question was to be reviewed as a question of fact."
The ABA in its proposed Code substantially adopted the portion of
the Task Force's proposed statute relating to judicial review. The perti-
nent provision is:
Section 1009(f) Decision on Review-If the court finds no
error it shall affirm the agency action. If it finds that the
agency action is .. . (7) based upon findings of fact that are
clearly erroneous on the whole record . . . then . . .the court
shall hold unlawful and set aside the agency action. . . . In all
cases under review the court shall determine all questions of law
and interpret the statutory and constitutional provisions in-
volved and shall apply such interpretation to the facts duly
found or established.90
The committee recommended that the scope of agency review be equiva-
lent to the standard applied by courts of appeal to fact findings of district
courts in civil non-jury cases.9" Beyond stating that the clearly erroneous
standard could be applied without authorizing substitution of judgment
88. Id. at 218.
89. Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939), presents an
example of this sort of reasoning. The issue was whether the corporation was "con-
trolled" 'by another corporation within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, 68 Stat. 63 (1954), 47 U.S.C. 152(b) (1958). The Court said, "In
vesting the Commission [FCC] with the duty of ascertaining 'control' of one company
by another, Congress did not imply artificial tests of control. This is an issue of fact
to be determined by the special circumstances of each case." Id. at 145.
90. The Administrative Procedure Act and the Ainerican Bar Association Pro-
posed Code of Federal Administrative Procedure, 24 ICC PRAc. J. 851, 877 (1957).
91. 81 ABA Rep. 376 (1956). The committee disapproved of the Task Force's
language, "dearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
on the whole record," as being productive more of confusion than of simplification. Id.
at 507.
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on findings of fact by the reviewing court, the committee did not forecast
the probable effect of the change. 2 It justified prescription of the clearly
erroneous standard by a desire for simplification.93 As to review of ques-
tions of law and mixed questions, the committee followed the Task
Force's disapproval of the rational basis test, recommending that the pro-
posed code insure that questions of law receive full review free of any
restrictive test."4 The committee did not attempt to clarify the doubtful
status of the fact-law distinction under its clause covering review of such
questions; it appropriated the Task Force's provision almost verbatim,
with no further comment.
The statements of the ABA and the Task Force on the expected
effect of substitution of the clearly erroneous standard are too brief and
general to be of value in any attempt to assess the precise effect of the
proposed change. This can therefore be judged only in the light of the
cases and commentary on appellate review of district court decisions under
rule 52 (a).
Questions of Fact and Factual Inference
The prospective effect of the use of the clearly erroneous test in re-
viewing facts found by agencies is a matter of considerable dispute; the
opinions of the commentators cover the entire range of possibilities. At
one extreme it is stated that clearly erroneous and substantial evidence
are practically the same standards, and that hence no substantial alteration
in the scope of review would be effected by the change.95 The moderate
position is that the change would result in some widening of the scope of
review, although the proposed rule would not require substitution of judg-
ment on questions of fact.9" At the other extreme it is said that use of
92. Id. at 507. The committee did note that the regulatory process "would be
unduly impeded if rational agency judgment could be superseded by judicial judgment."
Ibid. (Emphasis added.) This would seem to be approval of the rule of rationality as
to findings of fact and to assert that a similar rule is incorporated in the clearly
erroneous standard.
93. Ibid.
94. Id. at 493.
95. E.g., Cooper, Judicial Review, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1375, 1380-81 (1955);
Schwartz, Administrative Justice and Its Place in the Legal Order, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rzv.
1267, 126S (1955). Cooper represents this position when he states, "It would seem that
an agency finding that is not supported by substantial evidence is perforce clearly
erroneous; and one wonders whether it is also true that an appellate court would find
the decision of a trial judge to be 'clearly erroneous' only if the evidence supporting it
appears unsubstantial when viewed in the light of the opposing evidence." Cooper, supra
at 1280.
96. Sellers, The American Bar Association's Legislative Proposals Respecting
Legal Services and Procedures, 24 ICC Pr.Ac. J. 1115, 1121 (1957). Benjamin, with his
statement that substitution of the clearly erroneous standard can be characterized as a
"nudge" in the application of the substantial evidence rule, probably can be placed in
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clearly erroneous would encourage substitution of judgment.97 Finally,
there are those who refuse to predict the proposal's probable effect, but
forecast that a voluminous amount of litigation will be necessary to adapt
the standard to review of administrative decisions.9" In view of this con-
fusion, reference to the cases is necessary to determine which of the
prophesies is the most sound.
In those few decisions where occasion for a comparison of the
standards has arisen, courts have found a difference between them. In
District of Columbia v. Pace,99 where the Court confronted a statute
which prescribed both standards, it stated that review of jury verdicts
(under the substantial evidence rule) was "much more limited" than re-
view under clearly erroneous.' 0 More specifically, the court in NLRB v.
Southland Mfg. Co. 0 said that in review of a district court decision un-
der the clearly erroneous standard it was empowered to review the facts,
while in review of an agency decision under the substantial evidence test
its only power was to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the findings.0 2 And, in W.R.B. Corp. v. Geer,' where the court dis-
approved of the district court's apparent equation of the clearly erroneous
and substantial evidence standards, it said that review under the former
does not stop with a finding of substantial evidence. Even with such a
finding, the court must reverse the lower court's determination if "left
with the impression that the result is not the truth and right of the case.
In this sense, at least, the two terms are not synonymous."' 4  But the im-
pression left by these cases is weakened by Judge Soper's concurring
the same category. Benjamin, A Lawyer's View of Administrative Procedurc-Thc
American Bar Association Program, 26 LAw & CONTEMP. PROD. 203, 233 (1961).
97. Gatchell, The Impact of the Admnistrative Process on the Judicial Branch of
the Government, 16 FED. BAR J. 482, 488 (1956) ; Thomas, The American Bar Associa-
tion's Legislative Proposals as They Affect the Interstate Commerce Commission and
Its Practitioners, 24 ICC PRac. J. 1129, 1133 (1956). Leedom increases the confusion
by stating that review of agency decision is already more stringent than review of trial
court decision! Leedom, Judicializing the Administrative Process: Can Labels Really
Change Facts, 3 S.D.L. Rxv. 1, 6 (1958).
98. Fuchs, The Proposed New Code of Administrative Procedure, 19 OEIo ST.
L.J. 423, 429-30 (1958) ; Kramer, The Place and Function of Judicial Review in the
Administrative Process, 28 FORDHAm L. REv. 1, 76 (1959).
99. 320 U.S. 698 (1944).
100. Id. at 702. And see United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1946), where Judge Learned Hand, observed "It is idle to try to define the meaning of
the phrase 'clearly erroneous'; all that can profitably be said is that an appellate court,
though it will hesitate less to reverse the finding of a judge than that of an admin-
istrative tribunal or of a jury, will nevertheless reverse it most reluctantly and only
where well persuaded." Id. at 433.
101. 201 F.2d 244 (4th Cir. 1952).
102. Id. at 246.
103. 313 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1963).
104. Id. at 753.
opinion in NLRB v. Southland Mfg. Co., that the two standards are prac-
tically the same.'
A theoretical difference between the two standards is suggested by
the leading formulation of dearly erroneous in United States v. United
States Gypsum Co.' The Court there said that although the trial judge's
decision is entitled to great weight, it is not conclusive. A finding is
clearly erroneous and should be reversed when, "although there is evi-
dence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'
0 7
The rule, so stated, is a "rightness" test. The court is to guide its deci-
sion according to its independent sense of what is right, rather than by
what it thinks is rational, as under the substantial evidence standard. In
the opinion of the appellate court a finding may be rational but not right.
Different results should obtain under the two standards in that case.
This distinction is buttressed by statements that the clearly erroneous
standard includes review beyond a finding of substantial evidence. While
some courts professing adherence to the clearly erroneous standard seem
to have required only substantial evidence," 8 the majority has stated a
broader formula, i.e., a finding is not to be disturbed unless unsupported
105. True it is that the judgment of the Board is entitled to respect, and
weight must be given to its expertness in its specialized field, and we may not
try the case de novo or displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflict-
ing views; yet we must exercise our independent judgment if . . . we cannot
conscientiously find that the supporting evidence is substantial. Indeed it is
difficult to draw the line between the function of an appellate court in passing
on the decision of a trial judge sitting without a jury . . . and the function
of the court in reviewing the action of an administrative tribunal. . . . The
decision of the trial court must be sustained . . .unless it is clearly erroneous,
and its greater opportunity to learn the truth based upon its more intimate
contact with the case must be respected. In like manner the conclusions of an
administrative body may not be lightly set aside; but they too may not be
given effect if they are so erroneous or so unjust as to shock the conscience of
the court. The mental processes of the reviewing authority which are called
into action in each situation are so similar they can hardly be distinguished.
201 F.2d at 250. While admitting that the decisions of neither trial judge nor agency
should be affirmed if they are "so unjust as to shock the conscience of the court,"
one may still object to Judge Soper's analysis. Although he recognizes that the degree
of finality to be accorded the trial judge's decision because of his closer acquaintance
with the case also extends to the agency decision, he fails to note that the expertise of
the agency, not shared by the trial judge, may justify granting an even greater degree
of finality to its decisions.
106. 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
107. Id. at 395.
108. E.g., Bush v. Remington Rand, Inc., 213 F.2d 456, 461 (2d Cir. 1954);
Gamewell Co. v. City of Phoenix, 216 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1954); 2B BARRON & HOLT-
ZOFr, FEDERAL PRAcrICE AND PROCEDURE § 1135, at 549 and cases cited at n.79.1 (rev
ed. 1961) [hereafter cited as 2B BARRON & HoLTZoFF].
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by substantial evidence or against the clear weight of the evidence.' The
appellate court may thus reverse where, although there is substantial evi-
dence to support the trial judge's findings and inferences, it determines
that the clear weight of the evidence points the other way, having due
regard for the trial court's preferred position on issues of credibility.
The "rightness" test is embodied in this power of the appellate court to
substitute its independent judgment on the weight of the evidence.
If the case law went no further the distinction between the standards
would be clear. But the rule applicable to district court decisions requires
for reversal a finding not simply of error, but of clear error. The trial
court is not limited to deciding doubtful issues of fact correctly.1"
Rather, where the evidence admits of two equally permissible inferences,
the appellate court will not substitute its judgment merely because it might
have decided the issue differently had it been the initial arbiter."' The
appellate court's sense of rightness is therefore bridled to some extent; a
decision to reverse a trial court's finding requires firmness of conviction
beyond a bare feeling of rightness.
It is obvious that no firm conviction of rightness could exist where
the permissible inferences are of equal weight. Below this largely con-
ceptual state of affairs and in the vast majority of cases, one inference
will, to the reviewing court, outweight all others to some perceptible de-
gree. How much the one must outweigh its alternatives to allow a court
that firmness of conviction required for a reversal falls within the
shadowy realm of judgment noted by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Unizer-
sal Camera."2 But it is clear that the "firmness of conviction" factor in-
jects into the clearly erroneous standard a rule of rationality similar to
that under the substantial evidence standard."' At bottom, both stand-
109. Darter v. Greenville Community Hotel Corp., 301 F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir. 1962) ;
Cleo Syrup Corp. v. Coca Cola Co., 139 F.2d 416, 418 (8th Cir. 1943) ; 2B BARoN &
HOLTZOFF § 1135 and cases cited at n.80.
110. Cleo Syrup Corp. v. Coca Cola Co., 139 F.2d 416, 417 (8th Cir. 1943), and
cases cited.
111. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 495-96(1950) ; Darter v. Greenville Community Hotel Corp., 310 F.2d 70, 72 (4th Cir. 1962) ;
Remington Rand, Inc. v. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et
Commerciales, 188 F.2d 1011, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
112. "There are no talismanic words that can avoid the process of judgment. The
difficulty is that we cannot escape .. .the use of undefined defining terms." 340 U.S,
474, 489 (1951).
113. Compare the following statements: "[E]ven as to matters not requiring
expertise a court may [not] displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting
views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the
matter been before it de novo." Id. at 488 "[T]he Government has failed to establish
any greater grievance here than it might have in any case where the evidence would
support a conclusion either way but where the trial court has decided it to weigh more
heavily for the defendants. Such a choice between two permissible views of the weight
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ards give the initial decider some leeway beyond resolving factual issues
in the same manner as would the appellate court; in neither standard is
the test one of bare rightness.
The most that can be said is that the appellate court may be more
concerned with rightness under the clearly erroneous standard than under
the substantial evidence rule. It is probably true that in the majority of
cases the same result would be reached under either standard, and it is
only on the borderline where the court feels a decision is within reason,
although it has substantial doubt as to that decision's correctness, that
results might differ. This conclusion is based less upon theory than upon
the policy considerations affecting the finality to be accorded the deci-
sions of an agency and of a trial judge.11
One troublesome doctrine which has become attached to the clearly
erroneous standard as applied to factual inference should be noted, for it
is distinguishable from court practice under the substantial evidence
standard. While under the latter rule the fact that evidence is undis-
puted or documentary generally has no effect on the scope of review,"'
many cases have held that where the district court's finding is based up-
on such evidence the appellate court may impose a broader scope of re-
view than when evidence is oral or contradicted. The doctrine takes two
forms; first, where the evidence is documentary or undisputed an ap-
pellate court may more readily reverse the finding of the trial court;16
second, where the evidence is of this nature the court may draw its own
inferences as if the case were before it de novo, ignoring the clearly er-
roneous standard."' The rationale of this doctrine is that a trial judge's
only basis of claim to finality of his findings is his preferred position to
judge issues of credibility, and where credibility is not in issue the appel-
late court is equally qualified to draw inferences."' The doctrine is not
a general rule,"9 and there is a trend in some jurisdictions to the con-
of the evidence is not 'clearly erroneous."' United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S
338, 342 (1949).
114. See Section III, infra.
115. E.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 207 (1947).
116. Galena Oaks v. Scofield, 218 F.2d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1954); Equitable Life
Ins. Soc'y of the United States v. Irelan, 123 F.2d 462, 464 (5th Cir. 1941).
117. E.g., Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537, 539-40 (2d Cir. 1950). See also, United
Nations Reconstruction Agency v. Glass Prod. Methods, Inc., 291 F.2d 168, 172 (2d
Cir. 1961) ; National Latex Prod. Co. v. Sun Rubber Co., 274 F.2d 244, 247 (6th Cir.
1959) ; Pacific Portland Cement Co. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 178 F.2d 541, 548(9th Cir. 1949) ; Kuhn v. Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis, 119 F.2d 704, 705-06 (3rd
Cir. 1941).
118. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Johnson, 219 F.2d 590, 591 (3rd Cir. 1955).
119. See cases cited at 2B BARRoN & HoLTzoFF § 1132. The authors disapprove of
the doctrine, but Professor Moore supports it. 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 52.04, at
2642 (2d ed. 1951) [hereafter cited as 5 MoORE].
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
trary"' Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that the clearly erroneous
rule is applicable to inferences based on undisputed or documentary evi-
dence,' and in at least one case it reversed because the rule was not ap-
plied in those circumstances.' 22 But the doctrine that rule 52(a) does
not apply where the evidence is undisputed or documentary still exists
and is to be reckoned with in any decision to substitute clearly erroneous
for the substantial evidence test.
Mixed Questions of Fact and Law
The clearly erroneous standard has no application to decisions of
law, so a reviewing court is free to substitute judgment.'23 This un-
fettered review extends, in one view, to mixed questions, or as the courts
often call them, "conclusions of law." Thus it is held that "where the
ultimate finding is a conclusion of law, or at least a determination of a
mixed question of law and fact, it is subject to review, and on such re-
view the appellate court may substitute its judgment for that of the trial
court."' 4 The leading authorities agree, however, that substitution of
judgment is warranted only where the mixed finding was induced by or
contains an erroneous interpretation of the law, 2' despite general state-
ments such as those above that the court may substitute judgment on all
mixed questions.'26 But the limitation, which is founded on the better
view of the rule, does not always seem to be observed; courts sometimes
assert a power to substitute judgment on mixed questions where the issue
is primarily factual. 7 The sort of questions denominated conclusions
120. Note, Appellate Review of Findings of Fact Based on Documentary or Un-
disputed Evidence, 49 VA. L. Iv. 506, 524-25 (1963) and cases cited for First, Ninth
and Tenth Circuits at nn.107-09.
121. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291 (1960); United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394 (1948). But cf. United States v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, n.28 (1957).
122. Dayton Rubber Co. v. Cordovan Associates, Inc., 364 U.S. 299 (1960), re-
versing per curiam, 279 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1960). An interesting example of manipula-
tion of the fact-law distinction occurred on remand. While the circuit court reviewed
the issue as one of fact in its first decision, it reviewed the issue as one of law in the
second in order to support its original substitution of judgment on the district court's
finding. Cordovan Associates, Inc. v. Dayton Rubber Co., 290 F.2d 858, 861 (6th Cir.
1961).
123. 2B BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 1137, at 559-60; 5 MOORE § 52.05(1), at 2645.
124. Exmoor Country Club v. United States, 119 F.2d 961, 963 (7th Cir. 1941).
125. 2B BARRON & HoLTzoFF § 1137, at 563; 5 MooRE § 52.05, at 2647.
126. E.g., Fritz v. Jarecki, 189 F.2d 445, 448 (7th Cir. 1951).
127. E.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 82 (3rd Cir. 1948). In an
action in contract, the issue was whether a certain type of carrot was a "unique good"
such as would entitle plaintiff to specific performance. While the decision involved
application of a term recognized in the law, the decision was clearly a matter to be
decided primarily on the facts. Cf. Tepper v. Chichester, 285 F.2d 309, 312 (9th Cir.
1960), where the court said a finding of mixed fact-law "will not be set aside on any-
thing less than a demonstration of clear mistake in applying the law."
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of law in review under rule 52 (a) are analytically identical with those
labelled questions of fact in review of agency action. For example, in
Fritz v. Jarecki,"'3 where the issue was whether certain amusement devices
in an amusement park were "places" within the meaning of a statute im-
posing a tax on admissions, the court called the lower tribunal's decision
"'a conclusion of law or a determination of a mixed question of fact and
law," and substituted judgment."' So far as Fritz and similar cases are
concerned, the ABA's provision as to review of such questions when de-
cided by agencies is a fair reflection of the method, i.e., "in all cases under
review the court shall determine all questions of law and interpret the
statutory and constitutional provisions involved and shall apply such in-
terpretation to the facts duly found or established."'30
Despite this disposition to turn mixed questions into questions of
law, it is clear that courts in their use of the fact-law distinction some-
times do restrict their scope of review by calling the question one of fact
and applying the clearly erroneous standard. This occurs most frequently
in review of substantive issues similar to those decided by the agencies.
Thus, in Commissioner v. Duberstein, '3 the Supreme Court held that the
meaning of "gifts" in section 22(b)3 of the 1939 Internal Revenue
Code 12 was to be determined according to conditions of modern business
relations rather than according to common law standards. Although the
question was one of mixed fact-law, the Court reviewed it as a question
of fact. 3 And, in Graver Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co.,'34 where the
question was whether a welding process met statutory requirements for
patenting, the Court affirmed the district court's decision on a finding
that it was not clearly erroneousY" The Court's apparent reason for
treating the question as one of fact was its recognition that it depended
128. 189 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1951).
129. Id. at 448. See also Chandler v. United States, 226 F.2d 403, 405 (7th Cir.
1955); E.H. Sheldon & Co. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 655, 658-59 (6th Cir. 1954);
Plomb Tool Co. v. Sanger, 193 F.2d 260, 261 (9th Cir. 1952) ; Duquesne Club v. Bell,
127 F.2d 363, 364-65 (3rd Cir. 1942) ; Exmoor Country Club v. United States, 119 F.2d
961, 963 (7th Cir. 1941).
130. § 1009(f), A.B.A. PROPOSED CODE OF FEDERAL ADmINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE,
24 ICC PRAc. J. 851, 877 (1957).
131. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
132. 58 Stat. 809 (1942).
133. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291 (1960).
134. 336 U.S. 271 (1949).
135. Id. at 275. Mr. Justice Black's disagreement with this treatment in his con-
curring opinion throws the Court's action into sharp focus: "While accepting the
findings of those two courts on what I consider to be questions of fact, it is my view
that the ultimate question of patentability cannot properly be classified as a finding of
fact. I would adhere to this Court's earlier pronouncement that 'whether the thing
patented amounts to a patentable invention' is a question of law. . . ." Id. at 280.
See 2B BARRON & HoLTzOFF § 1137, at 564-65 for what may arguably be said to be
further instances of this elusive practice.
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primarily upon technical matters, and that the trial judge's more intimate
knowledge of these gave his decision considerable weight.13 In both
cases, review as if the question were one of pure fact can be justified by
the nature of the substantive issues involved. To the extent that courts
engage in this practice in review of trial court decisions, the ABA provi-
sion is an inaccurate reflection of appellate practice.
If that provision is made law, courts will face a problem of interpre-
tation, viz., whether they should substitute judgment on all mixed ques-
tions in accordance with a literal construction of the words, or adhere to
the primary policy declaration of the Task Force that agency decisions
are to be accorded the same review as those of district courts under rule
52(a).' Because a literal interpretation of the former directive would
in some instances impose a more searching scope of review than is now
used for district courts, a preference for the second choice is more likely.
If the provision were so interpreted, the fact-law distinction would retain
its relevance to the determination of the proper scope of review to be
applied.
In conclusion, the effects of a substitution of rule 52(a) and court
practice under it on the existing scope of review of agency decisions may
be predicted as follows:
First, as to questions of basic fact and factual inference, the change
should be slight, probably no more than the "nudge" toward a broader
scope of review expected by Benjamin."' As for the doctrine that the
clearly erroneous standard is not applicable where the evidence is docu-
mentary or undisputed, substitution of that standard would at least carry
the controversy over the doctrine into administrative law. The rationale
for that doctrine, it will be remembered, is that in such circumstances the
appellate court is as capable of deciding what factual inference should be
drawn as the trial court. In view of the fact that administrative discretion
and expertise are not explicitly recognized in the ABA statute, and the
fact that none of the ABA policy statements indicate that an agency deci-
sion is entitled to any more respect than a trial court decision, it is prob-
able that the doctrine will encourage, at least in the short run, judicial
usurpation of the agencies' primary fact-finding function.
136. 336 U.S. at 274-75.
137. REPORT TO THE CommiIssiON 218. The ABA Committee on Legal Services
and Procedure makes no similar statement. Beyond expressing its disapproval of the
rational basis test, it does no more than appropriate the Task Force's proposed provi-
sion. 81 ABA Rep. 507 (1956). But, in view of its uncritical acceptance, it is reasonable
to assume that it intended the same thing.
138. Benjamin, A Lawyer's View of Administrative Procedure-The Anerican
Bar Association Program, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 203, 233 (1961).
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Second, as to questions of mixed fact-law, the full review desired by
the ABA would be substantially accomplished evenz if the provision cover-
ing review of such questions were deleted. But if the provision is included
and then literally interpreted, agencies will be subjected to a more stringent
review than district courts, for the fact-law distinction will be eliminated
as a tool for the determination of the proper scope of review. In case
the provision is liberally construed, the disposition of the courts to label
the mixed question one of legal conclusion must be reckoned with. In
either event, broader review of mixed questions is likely."3 9 It remains to
be seen whether these changes are desirable.
III. CONCLUSION: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
It will be remembered that assumptions implicit in the ABA and the
Task Force proposals are (1) that the functions of the agency and the
district court are not so different as to require use of different scopes of
review and (2) that the "clearly erroneous" standard is better suited to
review of agency determinations than the substantial evidence standard.
Nevertheless, policy considerations affecting the finality to be accorded
the decisions of each fact finder may provide a basis for argument that
the two are sufficiently different to justify use of different scopes of
review.
In findings of fact and factual inference, both the trial judge and
the agency are entitled to some deference by the appellate court because
of their opportunity to hear the witnesses and become familiar with the
entire record. 4 ' In contrast, the appellate court has no contact with wit-
139. Whether the predictions as to review of mixed questions can be ascribed with
equal weight to Senate Bill No. 1663 is doubtful. The bill introduces only a minor
change in the existing provision. The APA states that "the reviewing court shall decide
all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions. .. "
60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1958). The bill would change this to read
"the reviewing court shall determine all relevant questions of law, including the inter-
pretation of constitutioiwi and statutory provisions.... ." SUBcOMm. ON ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SENATE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 1ST
SESs., AMENDMENTS TO THE ADmiNISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 39 (Comm. Print 1963).
(Proposed amendment in original italics.) The intent of the draftsmen appears to have
been to make more definite the affirmative duty to interpret statutory provisions by
changing the existing independent clause, which could be construed (albeit ungram-
matically) as only conferring a power, to a dependent clause, the effect of which is
determined by the preceding term "shall," which normally establishes a duty rather
than a power. Sutton, Use of "Shall" in Statutes, 4 JoHN MARSHALL L. REv. 204, 210
(1938); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 380, at 877 (1953). And see the recommendations of use
of the term where imposition of an affirmative duty is intended in DICKERSON, LEGIS-
LATIVE DRAFTING 80 (1954); K-ENNEDY, BILL DRAFTING 44 (1958). In the absence of
explanatory notes, it is difficult to determine whether the draftsmen intend to destroy
the rational basis test and the fact-labelling method; the question remains open.
140. 2B BARRON & HOLTzOFF § 1137, at 520; 5 MOORE § 52.05(1), at 2615; Stern,
Review of Findings by Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis,
58 HARv. L. REv. 70, 74 (1944).
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nesses and studies only those portions of the record brought forward by
the litigants. This consideration underlies the requirement of the clearly
erroneous test that the appellate court have more than a bare feeling of
wrongness of a factual conclusion of the lower tribunal to justify rever-
sal. Similarly, it may be said to underlie in part the rule of rationality
in the substantial evidence standard. The desirability of restricting the
number of appeals underlies both rules.
If both restrictive factors, i.e., the quantum of rationality in the sub-
stantial evidence standard and the quantum of rightness in dearly er-
roneous were supported only by these considerations, there would be good
reason for stating that the two standards are the same. But as to most
matters a district court has no claim to the experience and expertise of a
specialized agency, and these factors may be of considerable importance in
drawing conclusions on evidence of a complex or specialized nature. If
this consideration is to have any significance, and if the agency is to have
a role distinguishable from that of the traditional trial court, the latitude
of decision accorded it on appeal must be somewhat greater. To the ex-
tent that this consideration is recognized, the measure of rationality re-
quired by the substantial evidence rule would seem to be more tolerant of
the conclusions below than the corresponding measure of rightness under
the clearly erroneous standard. If the ABA proposals were adopted,
despite their failure to recognize in this connection the factors of ex-
pertise and specialized experience, and despite the ABA's statement that
courts are to apply the same scope of review as is applied to district court
decisions, it is unlikely that the courts would in the long run ignore these
factors. If the experience and expertise of the agency are admitted, the
eventual result would seem to be development of slightly different scopes
of review under the same rubric, i.e., slightly different quanta of right-
ness.
As to review of the application of law to facts-the mixed fact-law
decision-both the agency and the district court have the function of mak-
ing the initial decision. 4' But again, the factors which determine the
degrees of finality to be accorded on review to such decisions of agencies
and courts differ according to the nature of the adjudicator. The free
reviewability of mixed questions on appeal from a district court is
founded on the premise that the trial judge is in no better position to de-
termine the legal effect of the facts than the appellate court. Indeed, the
141. "The chief characteristic of the judicial system is deciding questions of fact
and law. But that is also a major function of executive and administrative action.
Executing the law requires a decision as to what the law provides, what facts it applies
to . . . -precisely the same matters which are the crux of a judicial decision."
Leedom, supra note 97, at 9.
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latter has the advantage of numbers and has at least equal competence in
matters of law.'42 The very existence of the appellate court implies that
its opinion of the state of the law is more likely to be correct than that of
the trial judge. 43 The uncertainty which results from the confusing na-
ture of the fact-law distinction has been noted; courts do not and cannot
always determine the essential nature of the mixed question according to
theoretical considerations. In view of the appellate court's historical re-
sponsibility for deciding questions of law, 4 ' there may be good reason
for resolving the problem of the mixed question in favor of complete
review, i.e., calling such a question one of law or a "legal conclusion."
In contrast, the current treatment of such questions on review of
agency decisions stands on entirely different policy considerations. In
1938, Professor Landis observed that the interesting problem remain-
ing for the future was whether courts, having withdrawn from free re-
view of agency fact findings, would similarly restrict their review of
legal conclusions. 4 ' Courts have partially accomplished this result by
developing the fact-labelling method and the rational basis test, while re-
taining a degree of discretionary power to substitute judgment where the
situation warrants it. This partial withdrawal from free review of mixed
questions represents a recognition of several factors unique to agency ad-
judication. First, as Landis noted, agency expertise is not limited to
fact-finding,"' but in theory should have application to questions of law.
Expertise, combined with the factor of continuity of attention, should
put the agency in a position to provide the case-by-case implementation of
general statutory standards, with the appellate court retaining power to
determine the permissible limits of statutory interpretation.
Further, there is the matter of congressionally delegated discretion.
While the relation of the district court to the court of appeals is simply
one of hierarchical inferior to superior, the relation of the agency to the
court of appeals is something different. The court's power of review is
superimposed upon the administrative exercise of delegated, specialized
authority. "' An agency decision goes beyond the traditional judicial de-
termination of conflicting private rights and requires the administration,
142. Stern, supra note 140, at 113.
143. Ibid.
144. Wright, The Doubtful Oinicieiwe of Appellate Courts, 41 MIqN. L. REv.
751, 779 (1957).
145. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 144 (1938).
146. Id. at 145.
147. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 141-44 (1940).
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if not the formulation, of public policy."' 8 When the court substitutes
judgment on a question within agency discretion it invades the realm of
policy which is the proper concern of Congress and the agency in its
capacity as the instrument of Congress."4 9
Finally, the very nature of mixed questions in agency determinations
may justify restriction of a court's scope of review. Where the statute
is dependent for its effectiveness on a judgment of economic or industrial
realities rather than on doctrines to be developed by courts, its implemen-
tation requires elaboration of its terms according to the facts as they
appear to the administering agency, and that the scope of the review be
adjusted accordingly.
In view of these differences between the roles of district courts and
administrative agencies, it seems clear that substitution of ordinary ap-
pellate practices in review of purely judicial proceedings would constitute
imposition of standards developed with reference to one set of basic
considerations to a situation involving quite another. The assumption
that the same policy foundations underlie review of the determinations
of the two kinds of adjudicators is simply not the case. The courts' accep-
tance of the ABA's proposal would involve impairment, at least for a
time, of the most important advantages of agency adjudication-expertise
and experience.
It is likely that courts would in the long run adapt a statutory clearly
erroneous standard for review of agency decision to its new role, i.e., ex-
pand the degree of conviction of rightness necessary to justify substitu-
tion of a judicial determination for the agency's. Whether courts eventu-
ally would arrive at approximately the same scope of review now being
used or whether, despite their relaxation of the standard, they would per-
sist in imposing a somewhat broader scope of review is a matter of con-
jecture. If a mandate for review of mixed questions were imposed, the
courts might reemphasize the practice of manipulating the fact-law dis-
148. Gatchell, The Impact of the Administrative Process on the Judicial Branch
of the Govenmient, 16 FED. BAR J. 482 (1956); Woll, Administrative Law Reform:
Proposals and Prospects, 41 NEB. L. R.v. 687, 695, 710-11 (1962).
149. Cf. the Court's statement in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177
(1941):
Congress could not catalogue all the devices and strategems for circumventing
the policies of the Act. Nor could it define the whole gamut of remedies to
effectuate these policies in an infinite variety of specific situations. Congress
met these difficulties by leaving the adaptation of means to end to the empiric
process of administration. The exercise of the process was committed to the
Board, subject to limited judicial review. . . . Courts must not enter the
allowable area of the Board's discretion and must guard against the danger of
sliding unconsciously from the narrow confines of law into the more spacious
domain of policy.
Id. at 194.
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tinction to reinstate the limited review of agency decision in this area. But
in any event the imposition of standards of review essentially unrelated to
the nature of administrative agencies seems unwise. The probable result
would be the development of two separate bodies of practice under the
same rubric, a result that would hardly be an improvement over the present
situation. It is submitted that if the scope of review is to be changed,
the better course would be formulation of rules not directly related to
current appellate practice. Any change will require a period of litigation
to implement the substituted standards. Use of new standards would
avoid the confusion that is inevitable in the application of the same rule to
decisions of different kinds of adjudicators,' and would encourage the
development of rules properly adapted to the actual functions of admin-
istrative agencies.
THE BUSINESS TRUST AS AN ORGANIZATION
FOR PRACTICING LAW
On numerous occasions Congress has recognized the substantial in-
equities in the tax structure for professional men who must conduct their
business in partnership form, and the Internal Revenue Service has re-
cently reaffirmed a desire to perpetuate those inequities.' Organizations
that can meet the requisites for taxation as a "corporation" or "associa-
tion" under the Internal Revenue Code receive manifold tax benefits a
partnership cannot which are too familiar to require enumeration.2 The
150. While the same criticism might be made of application of the substantial
evidence rule to jury and agency, it can be argued that whatever differences in applica-
tion ewist have been settled by several decades of practice under the rule.
1. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 64, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1959); S. Rep. No. 1615,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1960).
On December 17, 1963, The IRS published its long awaited proposed regulations
to Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1-2. Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1-2, 28 Fed. Reg. 243
(1963). If adopted, these regulations would exclude any possibility of professional
persons gaining corporate tax advantages. These proposed regulations, it is hardly
necessary to say, will be vigorously opposed, and face a slim chance of being adopted
in their present form.
2. Briefly summarized these benefits are: contributions to qualified pension and
profit sharing plans for lawyer-employees are deductible from income, INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 401(a) ; when profit sharing and pension plans are utilized, amounts up to
25 per cent of employees' yearly compensation is deductible, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 404(a) (7); the income from such plans is tax exempt, and may be reinvested taxfree,ibid; contributions made on behalf of an employee are not included in his income
until the money is actually received by him, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 402; if an
employee elects to receive the entire amount from these plans within one year of
termination of his employment, the amount received may be declared a long term capital
gain, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 402(a) (2), 1201(b) ; premiums on group life, health
